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Abstract 
 
Past research has found that explanations of group differences focus attention on lower status 
and less prototypical social groups, whilst positioning higher status and more prototypical 
groups as the norm for comparison.  The present experiment examined attention in 
explanations of national group differences.  239 Irish and British students read vignettes that 
attributed either relatively more overconsumption of alcohol, or of fatty foods, to either Irish 
or British people, and wrote explanations of these group differences in their own words.  As 
predicted, the explanations focused more on the group described as over-consumers.   
Participants did not explain the national out-group more than the national in-group, and did 
not explain the Irish or the British more.  Rather, explanations focused particularly on the 
Irish only when they were described as over-consumers of alcohol. These findings show 
flexibility in the setting of norms for comparison, and an influence of essentialist stereotypes, 
rather than ethnocentrism or historical power differences, on the spontaneous framing of 
explanations of group differences.  
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When people encounter differences between social groups, whom do they focus on as 
the figural cause of that difference, and whose attributes slip into the background as implicit 
norms for comparison?  The present study examines which national groups become the 
background norm for comparison among Irish and British students explaining differences 
between their two national groups.  The study develops a line of research which has 
examined the focus of attention in explanations of differences between social groups, and the 
present findings suggest one way that power may be enacted by drawing attention to the 
purported features of some national groups while dis-attending to others.  
 
Normative Identities and the Explanation of Group Differences 
Intellectual traditions such as Marxism (Marx & Engels), feminism (Bem, 1993, 
deBeauvoir, 1949/2011), African-American thought (DuBois, 1903; Morrison, 1993), 
gay/lesbian thought (Herek, 2007; Warner, 1993), post-colonial theory (Said, 1978), social 
identity theory (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Simon & Oakes, 2006) and their intersections 
(e.g., Lorde, 1984; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008), all share the assumption that higher 
status groups maintain their power by conflating their own characteristic with the universal 
case, such that powerless groups are positioned as ‘other.’  Social cognition researchers have 
reached similar conclusions from a different route on inquiry.  In an early experimental study, 
Miller, Taylor, and Buck (1991) found that American college students were far more likely to 
call to mind a man, rather than a woman, when asked to think of a typical voter.  Similar 
study participants also spontaneously explained gender differences in voting by describing 
features of women voters that made then different from male voters more than the reverse.  
Similarly asymmetric explanations of group differences that focused attention on the lower 
status group have been observed when students explained differences between sexual identity 
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groups (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; 2004) and differences between African-Americans and 
European-Americans (Pratto, Hegarty & Korchmaros, 2007).  Such asymmetric explanation 
have also been detected in the scientific record; psychologists’ published explanations of 
gender differences focus on women and girls more than on men and boys (Hegarty & 
Buechel, 2006). These asymmetries are large; participants in experiments typically reference 
lower status groups about three times as often as higher status groups when explaining 
gender, sexuality, or ethnic differences (see Pratto et al., 2007).  Such research suggests a 
social cognitive level of explanation of the dynamics of group hegemony and othering that 
operates by taking some groups as the norm and “others” as the effect to be explained.  
These asymmetrical explanations have been explained in social cognitive terms as 
effects of fleeting mental representations of social categories called category norms 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986). According to Kahneman and Miller (1986), category norms are 
representations that are constructed on-the-fly from exemplars of the relevant category and 
which exist fleetingly in working memory.  Category norms make the features of the 
exemplars from which they are drawn into implicit defaults for comparison, and focus 
conscious attention on the atypical features of category members (see also Pratto et al., 2007).  
Kahneman and Miller (1986) noted that category norms are frequently drawn from the most 
prototypical members of the category, but that prototypicality is only one determinant of 
inclusion in category norms. Thus prototypical examplars are most available to consciousness 
in many contexts, (e.g., Rosch et al., 1976), Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) norm theory 
allows an account of categorization that unconsciously – but not inevitably – takes the 
attributes of higher status group as the standard of reference for all.  Indeed, Kahneman and 
Miller (1986) were motivated to explain mental events such as the sense of surprise arising 
from discovering that an exemplar does not match the category norm, as when a person is 
surprised to learn that a woman’s spouse is also a woman (c.f., Land & Kitzinger, 2005). 
These authors also described event norms as defaults scripts for social events.  Just as atypical 
identities are spontaneously made the focus of explanation, atypical features of events are 
more likely to become the focus of social explanation and counterfactual thinking 
(Kanazawa, 1992; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Mandel & Lehman, 1996).    
Habitual asymmetric explanations of group differences also have consequences for 
the reproduction of power inequalities. When differences between fictional groups and 
familiar groups with roughly equal social power are described, readers infer that the group 
positioned as the linguistic norm for comparison is more powerful, is more agentic, and is 
less communal than the group positioned as the group to be explained (Bruckmüller & Abele, 
2010). Similarly when gender differences in leadership styles are described in terms of how 
men differ from women – rather than how women differ from men - the perceived size and 
legitimacy of male power, and the magnitude of the gender stereotypes that rationalize that 
power difference are all attenuated (Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & Abele, 2012). In sum, studies 
on habitual asymmetries in explanation, and their consequences for perceptions of intergroup 
relations suggest a feedback loop between beliefs about group’s status and the linguistic 
framing of group differences. Importantly, this feedback loop appears to operate not only 
when participants take part in experiments, but also when scientists publish descriptions and 
explanations of real social groups (Hegarty & Buechel, 2006).  As such, rendering 
asymmetric explanations of group differences may be a form of ‘ontological gerrymandering’ 
that puts lower status groups at a disadvantage by “making problematic the truth status of 
certain states of affairs selected for analysis and explanation, while backgrounding or 
minimizing the possibility that the same problems apply to assumptions upon which the 
analysis depends” (Woolgar & Pawluch, 1985, p. 216)  
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Nations as Category Norms 
How might norm theory predictions apply to the explanation of differences between 
similar national groups with a history of power inequality?  Nation states have been described 
as powerful, yet taken for granted, forms of social organization (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 
1995; Hobsbawm, 1990).  States can set the background norms with respect to which people 
live out their understandings of themselves as residents and citizens of particular nations. As 
Billig (1995) has noted, newspapers and other media are peppered with implicit references to 
the nation state that oblige people to take the nation as an implicit reference point in everyday 
life.   However, within social groups some individuals are often consensually believed to be 
more prototypical, ordinary or ideal members of the social category than are others. Most 
nationalities embed the language, religion or other ways of being of some of their citizens in 
the practices of statecraft to the exclusion of others (Hobsbawm, 1990; Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001).  As a result some sub-groups within the nation appear to be prototypical members of 
the national ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983) while others appear to be ‘ethnic’ 
minorities (Maybury-Lewis, 1997).    
Pratto et al. (2007) argued that state formation may engender asymmetric explanations 
of group difference.  While nation states have historically espoused equality for all, many 
have extended full rights and responsibilities of citizenship only to ethnic majority 
heterosexual male citizens (see Pratto et al., 2007).  Historically, groups marked as “other,” 
such as women, and ethnic, religious, sexual and linguistic minorities have continued to 
struggle to achieve those same rights within modern nation states, with variable success.  
Thus findings that women voters became the focus of explanation in late 20th century 
experiments in the United States (Miller et al., 1991) could evidence long-term ideological 
effects of the construction of citizenship within the United States in androcentric terms.  
However, Condor (2000, 2006) has also argued that the power of the state to set 
norms for citizens’ and residents’ understandings of differences may be quite contingent.  For 
example, in the European archipelago under study here, state power is made contingent by 
power-sharing agreements between the two ‘nations’ with regard to Northern Ireland, the 
devolution of power to Scotland Parliament and the Welsh Assembly within the UK, as well 
as the legal and economic framework of the European Union (including the Republic of 
Ireland’s inclusion and the UK’s exclusion from the Eurozone). Indeed, norm theory’s claim 
that different working representations of social categories can be constructed from different 
elements in different situations fits well with Condor’s (2006, p. 654) argument that nations 
are represented not by “simple person categories” but by “hybrid collections of human 
beings, objects, and geographical locations.”  
Qualitative studies also speak to diverse ways that people attend or dis-attend to 
specific features of nationality in talk. English people have been observed to obliquely 
reference ‘this country’ to rhetorically distance themselves from national identification while 
also voicing in-group pride (Condor, 2000).  English people most commonly talk about 
Britain’s island status when discussing Britain’s position within Europe, but Scottish people 
reference island status to assert British citizenship while disavowing a British social identity 
(Abell, Condor, & Stevenson, 2006).  Different locations with respect to the State affect talk 
among people with the same national identification.  Stephenson and Muldoon (2010) found 
that Roman Catholic Irish adolescents in Northern Ireland flagged their identification as 
“Irish” explicitly in interviews, while their counterparts in the Republic appeared keen not to 
appear “too Irish.”  Such qualitative studies demand a theory of social categorization that 
does justice to the flexible ways that states, nations, and geographical locations are 
constructed differently by ordinary people in diverse political and rhetorical contexts to 
account for both the stability and contingency of the effects of state power on people’s 
thinking and talking about national groups.   
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The present study is only the second attempt to study asymmetries in the explanation 
of national groups experimentally, and the first such attempt in which both national groups 
being explained were also sampled.  Hegarty and Chryssochoou (2005) examined the relative 
prototypicality of EU countries among British students, using classical Roschian methods, 
and relative prototypicality affected preferences for statements about similarity between 
countries (c.f., Tversky, 1977).  However, when asked to predict whether the findings of a 
study conducted in one country would generalize to others, patterns of induction, judgments 
of similarity between countries, and patterns of verbal explanation across three experiments 
all suggested that the country that had been first studied became the background norm, 
irrespective of its prototypicality.  The country to which participants were generalizing 
became the focus of expalanations of predicted group differences.  These findings cannot be 
easily explained by category-based induction models (Osherson, Smith, Wilke, Lopez, & 
Shafir, 1990) or in-group projection models (Waldzus, 2010) which predict that people will 
take more prototypical entities and social groups as reference points for judgment.  They are 
more consistent with feature-based models of induction (Sloman, 1993), and theories of 
attentional shifts (Kruschke, 2003) which both posit that people will conflate common 
features with more familiar categories and distinctive features with less familiar categories 
during learning and induction.   In conclusion then, the only previous experiments on the 
explanation of national differences emphasized how prototypicality did not determine which 
groups were positioned as the norm for comparison and which were the effect to be 
explained.  For that reason, the present experiment was approached with three competing 
exploratory predictions as to when participants would orient to the Irish and when to the 
British when explaining differences between them.  
 
The Present Study 
In the current study, British and Irish students explained Irish-British differences in 
alcohol and fatty food consumption, and the focus of their explanations was examined. The 
research reviewed above, suggested three competing hypotheses as to how participants would 
selectively attend to the particulars of each group.  First consider the possibility that Britain 
might serve as a normative comparison for such contrasts, just as men, straight people and 
European-Americans do, when gender, sexual identity, and ethnic differences are explained. 
Billig (1995) has described how the national status of more powerful nations, such as the 
United States, is referenced transnationally in banal ways that are unimaginable for less 
powerful nations.  The history of British colonization of Ireland, Britain greater size and 
population, Britain’s current privileged status within such international bodies as the UN, 
G20, and NATO, and empirical findings that British students consider Britain to be a more 
prototypical EU country than Ireland (Hegarty & Chryssochoou, 2005) all suggest the 
hypothesis that British people might become the norm for comparisons in all cases. If this 
were the case, then differences between British and Irish people should be explained by 
focusing on attributes of the Irish more than those of the British, just as explanations of 
gender, ethnic, and sexual identity differences have been found to focus on the attributes of 
lower status groups (Pratto et al., 2007).   
Second, a competing hypothesis is suggested by the possibility that the state strongly 
determines sets new norms for personhood among the citizens of a nation (Anderson, 1983; 
Billig, 1995).  Such ideological processes would lead Irish and British students to take their 
own national in-group as the default reference point when explaining differences, in an 
ethnocentric way (Levine & Campbell, 1972).  This hyopthesis is further suggested by 
Stevenson and Muldoon’s (2010) study in which Roman Catholic Irish adolescents who lived 
in a state that recognized their nationality as a default dis-attended to their Irishness while 
those who lived in a state in which their nationality was not a default spontaneously flagged 
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up their Irishness.  By sampling participants within both countries, this study allows a test of 
the hypothesis that nationals of both countries would take their own in-group as the norm for 
comparison. 
A third possibility is suggested by arguments about the limits of states in determining 
people’s constructions of the nation, and variability in their accounts (e.g., Abell et al., 2006; 
Condor, 2000, 2006; Stevenson & Muldoon, 2010). Stereotypes are widespread shared 
beliefs about the attributes of national groups (Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996), and stereotyping 
is the application of stereotypes in social judgment (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1996). 
Stereotyping might affect the focus of explanation of differences between national groups, 
particularly when the stereotype pre-dates the existence of the state itself.  One of the most 
pervasive and long-standing stereotypes of the Irish people concerns excessive alcohol 
consumption (Greenslade, Pearson, & Madden, 1995). This stereotype is evidenced even in 
the earliest US psychology experiments on ethnic stereotypes (Allport, 1954).  As is common 
among stereotypes, the stereotype linking the Irish with excessive alcohol consumption fails 
to recognize variability (Judd & Park, 1993), taking no account of the disproportionate 
number of Irish members of the Pioneer movement who abstain from alcohol altogether 
(Greenslade et al., 1995).  When a difference-to-be-explained is stereotype-consistent, then 
explanations might focus particularly on the stereotyped group, because the stereotype 
provides a ready-made essentialist explanation of the group difference (Yzerbyt, Rocher, & 
Schadron, 1997), suppressing alternative explanations that might invoke characteristics of the 
other group to-be-explained.    
To examine if explanations of national differences in excessive consumption of 
alcohol particularly affected the focus of explanations, participants were asked to explain 
why either the Irish or the British consumed alcohol excessively.  The experiment included 
control conditions in which participants explained differences in fatty food consumption.   As 
social explanations focus on violations of expectancies and of social scripts (Pratto et al., 
2007), I predicted that participants would focus their explanations on whichever national 
group were presented as ‘over-consumers’ of alcohol or of fatty foods.  The three alternative 
hypothesis described above were tested by examining where this focus on over-consumers 
was moderated.  If category norms were always formed around the higher status British 
group, then explanations should focus more on the Irish in all conditions.  If all participants 
formed nation-specific ethnocentric norms, then explanations should focus more on out-
groups in all conditions.  If explanations were affected by the stereotype linking the Irish with 
excessive alcohol consumption, then explanations should focus more on the Irish only in the 
conditions where differences in alcohol consumption are being explained.  
 
Method 
 
Participants   
One hundred and seventy-five psychology students in an Irish University who 
identified their nationality as Irish and 64 psychology students in an English university who 
identified their national as “British” “UK” “English” or “Welsh” participated in a classroom 
exercise.  No participants identified as Scottish. Fifty four foreign students who participated 
were excluded from the analysis presented below, including one British student in the Irish 
University.   Participants identified their gender as female (n =197) or male (n = 42), and 
their ages ranged from 17 to 50 years (M = 20.75, S.D.  = 4.78 years).   
 
Design 
 The study had a 2x2x2 design.  Participants were categorized as either Irish or British, 
and they read vignettes about excessive alcohol or fatty food consumption, in which either 
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Irish or British people were described as more common over-consumers.  Within each 
national group, participants were randomly assigned to condition. 
 
Materials 
The materials consisted of a one-page questionnaire which presented participants with 
bogus data and asked them to explain that data in their own words.  Four versions of the 
questionnaire manipulated whether the behaviour described was alcohol consumption or fatty 
food consumption, and whether the Irish or the British were described as over-consumers.   
The alcohol consumption materials that problematised the British read as follows: 
 
European Union Study of Alcohol Consumption Rates 
As part of a larger health initiative, the European Union (EU) has been examining 
rates of alcohol consumption in different EU countries. High rates of alcohol 
consumption can cause health problems over the long term.  This is known as 
problem drinking.  Last year an EU health researcher studied the drinking habits of 
1,000 people in each of fifteen EU countries over a three month period.  The 
percentage of participants with problem drinking habits was different among the 
British and Irish participants in the study.   
        Britain  Ireland 
Percentage of people showing problem drinking 35%  20% 
 
In the fatty food consumption conditions, the term “problem drinking” was replaced with the 
term “problem eating” and the term “alcohol consumption” with “fatty food consumption.”  
The percentages were the same in the alcohol and fatty food consumption conditions. In the 
conditions in which the Irish were the over-consumers, the percentages were reversed from 
those shown above.  In all conditions, participants were prompted to explain the findings in 
their own words as follows. 
 
Social scientists try to explain why differences between social groups were observed.  
Why do you think a difference was observed between these two groups here? 
 
Ten blank lines followed upon which participants were to write their explanations. 
Demographic items were presented last.  
 
Procedure 
All participants took part as part of a classroom exercise that was introduced as being 
about habits of explaining empirical data.  Participants within each country were randomly 
allocated to one of each of the four experimental conditions, and all participants worked 
independently of each other. After they had completed, participants were debriefed by being 
told that the data they had seen had been generated for the purposes of the study and that 
other participants in the room had seen and explained the opposite findings to the ones they 
had seen.  Both the rationale for the current study and past findings on asymmetries in 
explanations of group differences were described (e.g., Pratto et al., 2007).  Ethical approval 
for this study was granted by the Irish institution and the study was deemed exempt in the 
British institution.   
 
Coding of the Explanations 
As in previous studies on category norms and explanations, two coders used a coding 
scheme to determine the number of references to each target group in each explanation.  They 
coded several types of linguistic reference to each group.  First, they coded the use of 
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contrastive phrases such as “more than” or “less than” that contrasted one figural group 
against a background comparison of the other group (e.g., “Britain is more influenced by 
American culture than Ireland”).  Such contrastive references were coded as references to the 
figural group only.  Second, they coded all sentences in which one group was positioned as 
the agent of the verb in the sentence (e.g., “Ireland has a history of alcoholism”).  Third, they 
coded all sentences in which a group was made the object of some action (e.g., “In Britain, 
we are constantly reminded of the war on obesity”).  Fourth, they coded all statements about 
the group’s situation (e.g., “The beer is better in Ireland”).  Fifth they coded all adverbs that 
modified any of these verbs.  (“Britons may also just hide their drinking habits better”).   The 
first coder coded all explanations, and the second coder independently coded 63 explanations.   
Coders agreed about the number of references to Irish and to British people in the 
explanations (r (62) = .98, .97 respectively) and so the first coder’s scores were deemed 
reliable and analyzed.  
 
Results 
 
Participants produced between 0 and 14 references to Irish people and between 0 and 
17 references to British people.  Many participants focused exclusive on only one group, and 
made no reference at all to either the Irish (n = 115) or to the British (n = 182). Skew and 
kurtosis scores all fell outside the bounds for normality (all M/S.E.>|1.96|) and the data were 
analyzed using non-parametric statistics. See the mean number of references to each national 
group in each condition of the study in Table 1. 
 
Focus of Explanations of National Differences 
 The study’s design assumed that participants would focus attention on whichever 
group were described as over-consumers. I tested this hypothesis by splitting the sample 
according to the identity of the over-consuming group, and using a Wilcoxon signed rank test 
to examine which group was referenced more often.   As predicted, there were more 
references to the Irish than to the British when the Irish were described as the over-
consuming group (Ms=4.01, 1.09 respectively), Z=6.04, p<.001, and more references to the 
British than to the Irish when the British were described as the over-consuming group 
(Ms=2.99, 2.01 respectively), Z=1.99, p<.05 respectively.  Recall that the three competing 
hypotheses were tested by examining when and where this basic pattern was modified.   
First, to examine if Britain was constructed as the category norm across the board, I first 
examined if more references were produced to either of the two national groups within the 
experiment as a whole.  Wilcoxon tests showed that the explanations did include more  
             
Table 1: Mean Number of References to Irish and British People by Experimental Condition 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses).  
        
Over Consumers                  British                Irish                       
Type of Consumption Fatty Foods  Alcohol Fatty Foods  Alcohol   
Irish Participants 
 (n = 40) (n = 45)  (n = 48)           (n = 42)            
References to the Irish 2.38 (2.82) 1.64 (1.97) 2.52 (3.16)      5.45 (4.19)  
References to the British 3.47 (4.21) 2.07 (2.38) 1.48 (2.48) 0.55(1.40) 
British Participants 
 (n = 16) (n = 19)  (n = 13)           (n = 16)            
References to the Irish 1.69 (4.33) 2.37 (3.48) 4.31 (2.59)      4.50 (4.15)         
References to the British 2.06 (3.34) 4.94 (4.67) 2.15 (3.72)      0.50 (1.15)  
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references to Irish people than to British people overall (Ms=3.01, 2.05 respectively), Z = 
3.00, p =.003. Whilst this focus on the Irish - the traditionally less powerful group - is 
consistent with past norm theory findings, the size of the effect is considerably smaller than 
the 3:1 ratio of references observed in similar studies of explanations of ethnic, sexuality, and 
gender differences (see Pratto et al., 2007).   
Next I examined if participants were more likely to refer to attributes of national out-
groups than national in-groups, as theories of ethnocentrism might predict.  This hypothesis 
was firmly refuted.  Mann-Whitney tests showed that Irish and British students’ explanations 
included similar numbers of references to the Irish (Ms = 2.97, 3.13 respectively), U=5532, Z 
=.15, p=.88, and similar numbers of references to the British (Ms =1.86, 2.54 respectively), 
U=5312, Z =.69, p=.49.   
Third, to test the essentialist stereotyping hypothesis I subdivided the sample into four 
groups according to the identity of the over-consuming group and the form of consumption 
being explained.  As Figure 1 shows, there was a trend to focus explanations on over-
consumers in all cases.   Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed that this trend was not 
significant when the British were described as over-consumers of fatty foods, Z=0.48, p=.63, 
or of alcohol, Z=1.26, p=.21.  However, the trend to focus on Irish over-consumers was 
significant in both the fatty foods and the alcohol conditions, Z=2.26, p=.02, Z= 6.03, p<.001 
respectively.  Were these trends moderated by the form of over-consumption described? 
Mann-Whitney tests showed that more references were made to the Irish when they were 
described as over-consumers of alcohol rather than fatty foods, U=3105.50, Z=3.00, p=.003.  
Moreover, fewer references were made to the British when the Irish were presented as over-
consumers of alcohol rather than fatty foods, U=1450.50, Z=2.17, p=.03 respectively (see 
Figure 1).  In other words, attention shifted to Irish over-consumers particularly when they 
over-consumed alcohol rather than fatty foods. When the British were described as over-
consumers, participants in the fatty foods and alcohol conditions produced an equivalent 
number of references to the Irish, U=2604, Z=.09, p=.93, and to the British U=2545.5, Z=.34, 
p=.74. In other words, consistent with the stereotyping hypothesis, only the Irish became a 
particular focus of explanation when they described as over-consumers of alcohol.   
Discussion 
 
 In the present study, Irish and British students spontaneously focused explanations on 
whichever nation group was presented to them as over-consumers of alcohol or fatty foods, 
irrespective of whether that group was their own national in-group or out-group.  In addition, 
both groups of students particularly focused attention on the Irish when they were described 
as confirming the stereotype of the Irish as over-consumers of alcohol. In the condition in 
which the Irish were described as over-consumers of alcohol, 90% of the references coded 
were to Irish people, and only 10% were to British people.  In the other conditions, only 61% 
of the references that we coded were to the over-consuming group.  Of the three competing 
hypotheses presented in the introduction, these results clearly support the essentialist 
stereotyping hypothesis.   
Participants did not focus attention on the Irish across all conditions, suggesting that 
Britain does not serve as a norm for all British-Irish comparisons.  Interestingly, Hegarty and 
Chryssochoou’s (2005) observed that British students at the same campus as the one sampled 
here categorized the UK as a more prototypical EU country than Ireland.  National groups in 
this region do not become the focus of explanation simply because they have smaller 
populations, have historically held less power, or are perceived as less prototypical within 
overarching institutions such as the EU. This pattern of results renders these findings very 
different from previous of asymmetric explanations of gender, sexual identity and ‘ethnic’ 
differences (Pratto et al., 2007).  Rather the findings extend Hegarty and Chryssochoou’s 
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Figure 1: Mean Number of References to National Groups in Explanations of National 
Differences by Type of Consumption and Over-Consuming Group 
Note: Error bars denote standard errors within groups.   
        
 
(2005) findings that prototypicality has little effect on the construction of differences within 
EU countries.  While women seem to “have” gender more than men, and Blacks seem to 
“have” race more than Whites (c.f., Fiske, 1998), Irish people only “have” nationality more 
than British people do in particular kinds of circumstances.  
Nor do these results suggest that states have such determinative effects on their 
citizens thinking that people always take their own national in-group as the norm for 
comparison.  As such, these findings cannot be explained by the existence of ethnocentric 
category norms that render in-group national identities implicit and feature out-group 
identities as matters to be explained.  Even when participants are asked to think about 
differences that have come to light as part of a “health initiative” of the EU, they do not seem 
to take their in-group as the default standard of comparison, as models of in-group projection 
would suggest (Waldzus, 2010).  Past norm theory research on explanation has not always 
sampled participants from all members of the target groups.  For example, research on the 
explanation of sexual identity differences (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, 2004) and on ethnic 
differences in the US (Pratto et al., 2007) were conducted with largely straight, and largely 
European-American samples respectively.  Along with findings that women and men focus 
attention on groups similarly in explain gender differences that they write in experiments 
(Miller et al., 1991) or in psychology articles (Hegarty & Buechel, 2006), the present 
experiment suggests that habits of explanation construction may be similar across social 
groups in many circumstances.   
The support for the essentialist stereotyping hypotheses in the results of this 
experiment suggests a flexible and situation-specific process of foregrounding and 
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backgrounding.  This pattern is consistent with the flexible use of essentialism in the 
discourse of differences and similarities among citizens and immigrants (Verkuyten, 2003), 
as well as the rhetorical ways that Irish, English and Scottish people have been shown to 
attend and dis-attend to Irish and British national identities in talk (Abell et al., 2006; Condor, 
2000; Stevenson & Muldoon, 2010).   However, we cannot conclude that this flexibility was 
simply rhetorical. Postmodern accounts of speech act theory emphasize how speakers do not 
necessarily “possess” the terms by which their own speech acts proceed (Butler, 1997). 
Similarly, Condor (2006, p. 673) points out that discourse about identity often has features 
which are not intended by the speaker but which are made available by the structure of the 
discourse itself.   It is difficult to see how either self-serving or group-serving motives would 
lead both Irish students and British students alike to all attend to the Irish particularly when 
described as over-consumers of alcohol.  Rather, this study confirms the power of essentialist 
stereotypes not only to predetermine the attributions that are made about group differences, 
but also to predetermine to whom those differences will be attributed.   
The use of student participants to test these hypotheses may seem ironic, particularly 
when their long-standing status as the unmarked norm as participants in psychology studies, 
and their increasing use even in cross-national studies are kept in mind (Danziger, 1990; 
Moghaddem & Lee, 2006).  Moreover, my categorization of some of the students as “British” 
is contestable, as many identified with nationalities within the United Kingdom such as 
“English” or “Welsh.”  The experimental method demands the construction of participant 
groups that are certainly open to alternative constructions.  Ontological gerrymandering that 
foregrounds some questions and backgrounds others is inevitable in social science research 
(Woolgar & Pawluch, 1985), and such gerrymandering frequently occurs when social 
scientists present their accounts of participants’ identities in realist terms while drawing 
attention to the way that those same participants flexibly construct social identities in their 
own terms (Hammersley, 2003).  Clearly this is the case in my construction of participants as 
“British” rather than as “UK participants” or as “English and Welsh participants.” 
In conclusion, I would urge readers not to allow the use of orthodox methods of 
experimentation, student participant samples, or social cognitive levels of description and 
explanation here to imply that these patterns of explanation are ‘natural’ or inevitable.  
Explanation is a constructive process that goes beyond the information given (Asch & Zukier, 
1984; Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990), and explanations of group differences not only occur 
in everyday talk and in psychology classrooms, but also in determinative policy contexts of 
the sort modelled here, in which powerful actors in supranational organizations like the EU 
attempt to formulate evidence-based policy.  Models of modern state power sometimes 
assume that those who are the target of attention are also the most disempowered (Foucault, 
1977/1975).  In such a context, it is important to know that category norms are applied 
flexibly, and that stereotypes affect who becomes explained when national differences 
become visible to the public and to policy makers through empirical research. Quantitative 
studies such as this one can form critical resources that explain how explanations get framed 
in discourses that are assumed to be objective (Hegarty & Buechel, 2006), but which 
nonetheless have consequences for the groups who are being explained (Bruckmüller et al., 
2012).   
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